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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4694
This paper investigates the relationship of household 
income with child labor. The analysis uses a rich dataset 
obtained in the context of a conditional cash transfer 
program in a poor region of Nicaragua in 2005 and 
2006. The program has a strong productive emphasis 
and seeks to diversify the work portfolio of beneficiaries 
while imposing conditionalities on the household.  The 
author develops a simple model that relates child labor 
to household income, preferences, and production 
technology.  It turns out that child labor does not always 
decrease with income; the relationship is complex and 
exhibits an inverted-U shape. Applying the data to the 
model confirms that the relationship is concave when all 
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understand the impact of social programs on children's work. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at xdelcarpio@worldbank.org.  
children (8-15 years of age) are included in the sample.  
Expanding the analysis by stratifying the sample by age 
and gender shows that the relationship holds only for 
older children, both genders. The author investigates the 
effect of the conditional cash transfer program on child 
labor. The results show that the program has a decreasing 
effect on total hours of work for the full sample of 
children. Disentangling labor into two types – physically 
demanding labor and non-physical labor –  reveals that 
the program has opposite effects on each type; it decreases 
physically demanding labor while increasing participation 
in non-physical (more intellectually oriented) tasks for 
children. 
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I.  Introduction  
 
Prior theoretical work on child labor has attempted to establish a link between poverty and child 
labor by modeling the relationship and obtaining interesting, but disparate results.  Parallel to this, 
a whole body of empirical work designed to study this seemingly important relationship emerged; 
a few notable papers mix both, theory and empirics, in order to improve our knowledge of the 
causes and consequences of child labor and provide us with the groundwork necessary to evaluate 
this complex relationship.  Unfortunately, good panel data on child labor (e.g. children’s time use, 
activity types) and income data in the same survey are rare; as a result, we have been limited in 
obtaining conclusive evidence on why child work is present in households at various levels of the 
income distribution.   
The research question in this paper is evaluated in the context of a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program targeted at improving human capital outcomes of school aged children 
and the productive possibilities of a sub-set of households in a poor rural region in Nicaragua (see 
Macours and Vakis, 2005 for detailed program information).  In this paper we ask if child labor 
always increases with income. Moreover, we expand our research question to incorporate the 
CCT program into the analysis and pose a secondary question, how does a cash transfer program, 
with three distinct interventions and meant to improve the economic welfare of the families, 
affect child labor?  The empirical section makes use of a rich panel data-set collected for a 
randomized experiment.   
The paper contributes to the child labor literature through a simple yet comprehensive 
model and an empirical application by revisiting the relationship between income and child labor; 
more specifically the paper evaluates what happens to child labor in households that are distinctly 
placed at various levels of the income distribution.  The model illustrates the relationship of 
different forms of child labor with each other and with household production and assets; it allows 
for the inclusion of a transfer program through a tax on child labor or a subsidy to alternative 
activities (such as education or leisure).  Given that the CCT program offers standard benefits
1 
plus income to promote productive activities in non-agricultural work, the expected effect of the 
program on child labor ex-ante is ambiguous.   
For the purposes of this paper we use several definitions that influence our theoretical and 
empirical approach.  We follow the definition of human capital used by Bardhan and Udry (1999) 
                                                 
1 Traditional CCT benefits are transfers for nutrition, education fees, materials, teachers etc. and cash for basic health visits.  In this 
program the health component was not implemented. 
  1where they use the term human capital to cluster factors such as nutrition, health, formal 
education and on-the-job training.  We follow the international labor office (ILO) definition for 
child labor, that is any activity other than study or play that is remunerated or not for children 15 
years or younger.  We build on this definition in part of our analysis by disentangling the word 
labor into two types: non-physical labor—this is a combination of commercial savvy, calculation 
ability, intellectually oriented tasks—and, physical labor—based almost solely on physical 
strength.    
The definition for non-physical labor is consistent with the objective of the program, to 
improve the economic opportunities of households by diversifying their labor activities from 
agricultural-dependency to non-agricultural activities.  More specifically, in our sample 
households primarily dependent on non-agricultural work, to include tradesmen, professionals, 
merchants, service providers etc. earned 21% more income in 2005 than households mostly 
dependent on agricultural work.  Many people lack the necessary skills to work in these activities 
and the costs to obtain the necessary skills are high enough to make them inaccessible for many.  
The program seeks to increase the earning potential of beneficiaries by promoting non-
agricultural activities; it does this through vocational training, business creation and business 
training in order to enhance the skills of beneficiaries and reduce their exposure to risks stemming 
from agricultural dependency. 
Given that the program was designed to reduce income vulnerability due to risk from 
weather shocks we consider that a skill enhancing activity is one that changes occupational 
practices of people (e.g., agriculture, animal raising) and increases their productive capacity in the 
future.  These skills can be used through non-household employment as well as self-employment 
but not be directly dependent on land or animals.  Any type of activity that has value added such 
as: services, commerce or trade (to include animal trading and commerce of animal products), 
formal or informal employment in a non-farm setting and/or profession qualifies in this category.  
A physically oriented activity on the other hand is one that depends on the land and/or animals 
directly, entails farming and harvesting farm products primarily for household consumption, 
raises animals primarily for household consumption not commerce, gathers goods (i.e., wood, 
water) for household use and takes care of household chores.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we present the 
background literature on child labor that helped motivate this research.  Section III develops the 
theoretical model of income and child labor.  Section IV presents the program background and 
gives some specific information on the selection of the sample used in this research.  Section V 
presents some stylized facts and descriptive statistics from the dataset, focused on child labor and 
  2other factors that influence the behavior of households toward child work.  In Section VI we 
discuss the empirical implementation of the model.  In Section VII we present the results and a 
brief discussion, and Section VIII contains concluding remarks. 
II.  Related literature  
One side of the child labor and wealth (income) literature agrees with Basu and Van (1998) where 
they propose that having the child not work is a luxury that poor families can rarely afford, and as 
income increases the poor family can afford more leisure: “Luxury axiom”
2.  Other studies find 
that child labor is a consequence of inequality in the distribution of non-labor income 
(Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999) or economy wide poverty reflected at the household level 
(Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995).  In the case of poverty, studies find that schooling is often traded 
for work during difficult economic times (Edmonds, 2003; Edmonds and Turk, 2004; Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti, 2005).  This finding is extremely important because it shows that parents 
recognize the importance of human capital accumulation and want to do what it takes to increase 
the earning potential of the kids in the future, such as enrolling them into school or engaging them 
in skill-forming activities, when resources permit it.   This is consistent with altruistic arguments 
presented in the literature and stemming back to Becker and others (Becker and Lewis, 1973) but 
is not inconsistent with the possibility of parent’s wanting to improve the human capital of their 
kids for reasons other than altruism.   
Previous work also finds that when parents are faced with liquidity constraints, 
particularly in the absence of functioning capital markets (Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan 
2001; Dehejia and Gatti 2002) they are more likely to engage their children in work, despite their 
preference for having children not work at all or only in certain types of activities.  These studies 
directly or indirectly argue that parents would be willing to borrow against the children’s future 
earnings to potentially fulfill their preference of increasing the human capital acquisition of their 
children today, but in the absence of credit markets, they are forced to remove their kids from 
school (or reduce their study-leisure time) and in most cases have children work. 
The opposite strand of the literature presents a wealth paradox argument that challenges 
the luxury axiom.  This literature finds that child labor increases in periods of economic growth 
and children in wealthier families—in terms of assets and land which are found to be correlated to 
the household’s income—work more than children in asset-poor households (Parsons and Goldin, 
1989; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Rogers and Swinnerton, 2004).  One of the arguments for this 
                                                 
2 To be more specific, the luxury axiom proposed by Basu and Van in 1998 can be explained as follows:  a family will send the 
children to the labor market only if the family’s income from non-child labor sources drops very low.  In other words, having a child 
not in the labor market is a luxury that poor families can rarely afford.  This axiom indicates that as the family’s income increases the 
consumption of this luxury is more feasible, thereby development efforts to reduce child work could concentrate in helping families 
attain a minimum level of income in order to reduce child work. 
  3challenge is the presence of imperfect labor and land markets in most developing countries
3.  
Another explanation is that children have to take up more domestic chores as adults are busied in 
household enterprises (Hazarika and Sarangi 2005).  The unequal distribution of land in poor 
countries, with heavy reliance on land production in agrarian societies, is biased toward wealthier 
households.  Wealthier households who are unable to hire laborers, due to labor shortages, have a 
larger incentive to employ their own family; particularly when the marginal product of labor is 
increasing in land size.   
Other reasons given for preference for family over a hired hand are: moral hazard, 
easiness of shirking in volatile weather areas, reliance and overall trust (Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg, 1987; and Foster and Rosenzweig, 1994).  In this paper we consider an alternative 
reason, that not all child labor is deemed negative or harmful (Edmonds, 2007) and parents, who 
seek to enhance the human capital of their children and/or recognize their capacity to learn, can 
potentially distinguish between the prospective contributions of some work activities.  Moreover, 
not all child labor occurs at the expense of schooling or interferes with human capital 
accumulation, particularly for younger kids who tend to combine both activities (Cartwright and 
Patrinos, 1999); in some cases child work enables school attendance by increasing the household 
income as well as improves the productive capacity of the child through the attainment of labor 
skills.   
Other potential advantages of child labor explored in this paper are consistent with 
findings in previous studies where child labor seems to serve as training experiences for the 
children who obtain and enhance new skills well before adulthood (Rogers and Swinnerton, 2002; 
Raju, 2005).  Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2005) find that young adults who attained work 
experience as children had higher earnings in wages and farm work than others with less or no 
experience.  More interestingly, the author’s find that the loss in wages due to early abandonment 
of formal schooling was fully offset by the work experience obtained as a child.  These results 
however, are applicable for a few years after the work experience is attained as the returns to 
work experience decrease over time. 
A literature review by Dar et al. (2002) presents 13 empirical studies where the effects of 
household welfare on child labor are evaluated and find that there is strong support for the luxury 
axiom presented by Basu and Van (1998).  The literature review also concludes that although 
welfare has a significant impact on child labor and the relationship appears to be inversely related 
there are some studies that cast doubt in the strength of the relationship pointing to other factors 
                                                 
3 Weak land markets are a problem because few or no land sales take place, so the asset can only be productive if it is exploited 
through farming but not through selling or renting it.  When credit markets exist, the dynamic could potentially change. 
  4as being equally or more important.  In an effort to reconcile the diversity of findings in the 
poverty and child labor relationship Basu, Das, and Dutta (2007) examine the possibility of an 
inverted U-shape relationship.  This relationship provides the theoretical basis to this paper and 
the model developed in the paper.     
This research is done in the context of a social program that transfers income and skills 
(through training) to families conditional on various types of human capital investments (i.e., 
school attendance, nutrition, vocational training) and physical capital investments (e.g., goods, 
equipment).  More specifically, for one third of the treated families there is an added 
conditionality of starting a non-agricultural business while another third of families are 
conditioned on enrolling a family member in a vocational training course.  This context of this 
paper is very different from the contexts explored in most studies in the child labor literature 
because of the type (multi-component) and design (randomized) of the program under evaluation.   
Other studies, namely impact evaluation reports on conditional cash transfer programs (Skoufias 
and Parker, 2001; Maluccio and Flores, 2004; Attanasio et. al. 2006; Glewwe and Olinto, 2004) 
present some resemblance to the context.  In spite of this, some of these studies limit their 
analysis dichotomous outcome variables (Raju, 2006) and none of the programs include 
investments in productive activities in the household, a critical factor influencing child work.   
III.  Theory 
III.1 Model structure: Income and child labor  
In this section we present a model where there are benefits and costs of child labor, as in Basu, 
Das and Dutta (2007); and where different types of child labor are combined with adult labor and 
capital to obtain household production.  Apart from exploring income effects on child labor, the 
model allows us to study the effect of a CCT on households’ choices with respect to two types of 
child labor.  
The model endogenizes the household decision regarding child labor.  Its purpose is to 
illustrate the relationship of different forms of child labor with each other and with household 
production and assets.  We focus on poor economies with simple production technologies and 
rudimentary markets.  For simplicity we assume that all households produce a single good that 
cannot be saved or stored.  Therefore, there is no trade across households, and in each of them 
consumption equals production.  The analysis of this economy can then be addressed from the 
perspective of any household at a given period of time. There are four factors of production: 
physical capital (including land), K; adult labor, Q; non-physical child labor, H; and physical 
child labor, L.  They are combined according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function.   
  5There are appealing features to the use of Cobb-Douglas; one is that it allows for partial 
substitutability between production factors (as well as partial complementarity).  The second is 
that we can identify the optimal use of a factor of production as a function of overall production, 
the marginal product is a constant multiple of the factor intensity times the average product.  The 
third feature is the ability to characterize the factor intensity as a simple parameter, thereby 
allowing us to do comparative statics.  The production function looks as follows: 
1 YA L H Q K
α βγ α β γ − −− =                     (1) 
Where the factor intensities,α,β,γ, and (1-α-β-γ), are inside the interval (0,1).  Moreover, 
we assume that the production function is so rudimentary that it uses considerably more 
intensively physical-labor than non-physical child labor.  Therefore,  
α β >>               ( 2 )  
Capital and adult labor are household endowments and, thus, are provided at fixed 
supplies that are determined exogenously.  The two types of child labor are flexible and derived 
endogenously as a family decision based on utility optimization.  The utility function considers 
two main components that establish a trade-off for child labor: if children worked more 
intensively, more could be produced and consumed by the family but the children would be less 
happy and less developed.  Specifically, then, the first component of the utility function is the 
consumption of the single good, Y.  For simplicity and in order to consider decreasing marginal 
utility of consumption, we assume that the utility function is quadratic in consumption, with a 
positive coefficient on the linear term and negative one on the squared term.  The second 
component is the disutility of child labor, which we model as a linear function of each type of 
child labor, both with negative coefficients.  The utility function is then given by,   




uM Y Y l Lh H =− − −                (3) 
Where, the parameters M and P and the possibility of production Y are assumed to be 
such that the household will never reach negative utility of consumption.  Families dislike child 
labor because it takes time and energy away from formal education and leisure, and because it 
may even hurt the health and normal development of the child.  It then stands to reason that non-
physical child labor imposes lower utility costs than the physically demanding type.  This implies 
that, 
                    hl <             ( 4 )  
  6Optimal child labor, L* and H*, is obtained by maximizing the utility function in 
equation (3) with respect to the control variables, L and H.  Substituting the production function 
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Figure 1 presents these functions, along with some critical points for L*, H*, and Y.   It 
illustrates the inverted-U-shape relationship between child labor and income/production.  It also 
shows the differences and similarities between the two types of child labor: if the production 
function is sufficiently rudimentary, physically demanding child labor tends to be more prevalent 
than the non-physical type.  Both, however, move in the same direction with respect to changes in 
income. 
Figure 1.  Optimal Child Labor (L* and H*) as a Function of Income (Y) 
 
  7 Beyond this graphical presentation, the equations for optimal child labor allow us to 
formally derive the following conclusions:   
-First, L* and H* are concave functions of Y, which implies that optimal child labor first 
increases and then decreases with household production (or income).  In fact, the marginal effect 
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= .  Below this threshold, both types of child labor 
increase as production expands, although at gradually lower rates.  Above the threshold, child 
labor declines as production increases.  The intuition for this result is as follows: for very poor 
families, consumption is so low that they apply child labor to increase production when the 
opportunity arises (in the form of larger endowments of the other production factors).  When 
families achieve a certain level of income, the cost and grief of child labor start to weigh more 
than the corresponding foregone consumption, and, therefore, child labor decreases as production 
opportunities arise.      
-Second, the impact of the endowment of physical capital, K, and adult labor, Q on 
optimal child labor, L* and H*, depends on both the level of income, Y, and the relative scarcity 
of the corresponding factor endowment (i.e., Y/K and Y/Q).  Specifically, the marginal effects are 
given by the following equations.  For physically intensive child labor,   
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And for non-physical child labor, 
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           ( 1 2 )  
The mechanism by which changes in K and Q affect L* and H* goes through income: the 
endowed production factors affect income and consumption, and this in turn determines optimal 
  8child labor.  Thus, in all cases, the second term in brackets is the marginal effect of income on the 
respective type of child labor ( * L
Y
∂
∂ , and  * H
Y
∂
∂ ), and the first term is the marginal product 
of the corresponding endowed factor of production ( Y
K
∂
∂ , and  Y
Q
∂
∂ ).  Then, an increase in 
capital or adult labor would produce a rise in child labor if the household is relatively poor and 
would lead to a reduction only if it is sufficiently rich.  Moreover, the effect on child labor would 
be larger (in absolute value) if the endowment of the changing production factor (K or Q) is 
relatively scarce (so that it’s marginal product is large).  For illustration, consider the following 
example.  Suppose a household is sufficiently rich (so that Y>Y*), and this wealth is based on a 
large supply of adult labor despite a low endowment of land capital.  The result just presented 
implies that, for this household, an increase in land capital would have a larger reducing impact 
on child labor than a rise in adult labor would.   
-Third, physical child labor, L*, will be larger than non-physical child labor, H*, if the 
household production function is relatively backward (in the sense of being more intensive in the 
use of unskilled labor) and the difference in the utility loss from the two types of child labor is 
sufficiently small (which happens, for instance, when the learning opportunities of non-physical 
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Note that although L* and H* are functions of Y, the ratio of L* to H* is only a function of 
technological and preference parameters.  It is important to realize that the utility loss of child 
labor can be different depending on the child’s gender and age; moreover, this utility loss can also 
be affected by policy, as in the case of enforced prohibitions of specific types of child labor and 
pecuniary or in-kind transfers to promote certain others.  In order to analyze these alternatives, it 
is interesting to assess how the size of one type of child labor relative to the other varies with the 
parameters h and l.  Taking partial derivatives of equation (13),   
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     ( 1 5 )    
  9As expected, the impact of an increase in the cost of non-physical labor is a rise in the 
ratio L*/H*.  Conversely, this ratio will decline if the cost of physical demanding child labor 
increases.  For example, if the cost of L is lower for girls than for boys, then the proportion of 
girls doing agricultural labor will be larger than that of boys.  Also, if the cost of H declines with 
age (because the opportunity cost of formal education is lower as the child gets older), then the 
proportion of children doing work using calculation skills at work will be smaller in older 
cohorts.  Finally, if a conditional transfer program provides at the same time an implicit subsidy 
for children’s time away from work (e.g., by rewarding school attendance) and creates more 
opportunities for non-physical labor (e.g., by promoting non-traditional business opportunities for 
the household), then both L* and H* will decline but the ratio L*/H* will increase.  
-Fourth, the impact of Y on L* is greater in absolute value than the impact of Y on H*, 
except at the turning point, Y=Y*, at which they are the same.  In fact, except at the turning point, 
the ratio of the partial derivatives of L* and H* with respect to Y is exactly the same as the ratio 















































Therefore, for relatively poor families (Y<Y*), physical intensive child labor rises faster 
than the non-physical type as income increases.  By the same token, for relatively rich families 
(Y>Y*), physically demanding child labor declines faster when income rises.      
IV.  Program background 
The intervention presented here is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program targeted in a shock 
prone region in the northern-central part of Nicaragua where beneficiaries were randomly 
assigned to one of three groups: treatment 1, treatment 2 or treatment 3.  The selection of 
beneficiaries was done using a proxy-means approach commonly used for targeting households in 
this type of program.  The selection design had two stages.  The first stage was to select, at the 
community level, whether a community would be treated or not-treated. This stage was done by 
pairing communities based on geographic and climatic parity and conducting a draw of which 
  10would receive the program.  Once the treatment communities were determined all households 
below a poverty threshold (approximately up to 90% of the total distribution, excluding the top 
10%) were eligible for the program and were randomly assigned to one of the three interventions 
through a participatory lottery.   
The experimental design of the program (Macours and Vakis 2005) provides the ability 
to have more than one counterfactual (control versus treatment) by providing three distinct 
interventions and one control; each one of the groups is comparable to the other at baseline which 
allows for the effectiveness of each intervention to be evaluated. As Bourguinon, Ferreira and 
Leite (2003) stated in their paper, having more than one counterfactual allows us to answer policy 
questions more assertively.     
This program has some similarities with a previously implemented CCT in the country
4 
but was modified and created as a pilot to fit the context for a region that suffers from various 
climatic and economic shocks.  The intervention provides income transfers and some in-kind 
benefits (e.g., training) to poor families in the region to improve their human capital (i.e., 
education, nutrition, training, health) and physical capital (e.g., inventory for businesses, 
equipment).  The approximate value of the cash transfers is in the range of 25 to 45 percent of 
household income, depending on which package the household receives.  Two-thirds of randomly 
selected families receive one of two productive options: a training program or a matching grant 
for a productive investment such as a small-start-up business.  These benefits are intended to 
diversify the economic activities and improve future labor options of members in beneficiary 
households.   
As mentioned before, the program consists of three main treatment types or interventions 
(1) “basic intervention” which funds education (contingent on school enrollment), health 
(contingent on regular check-ups) and nutrition; (2) “Training intervention” which consists of the 
basic intervention plus an occupational training program that includes a $90 transfer for transport 
and opportunity costs.  This intervention consists of scholarships that allow one member of the 
household to select among a number of vocational courses to be delivered at the municipal 
headquarters by specialized instructors.  These participants also had classes in labor-market 
participation, civic responsibility and business-skill improvement; classes were usually attended 
by students alone.  (3) “Productive investment or business grant intervention”, which is the basic 
intervention plus a $200 grant to invest in a non-agricultural productive activity (i.e. a new non-
agriculture business or an expansion of an existing one) aimed at encouraging recipients to 
diversify their income source.  This intervention also has a business training component that is 
                                                 
4 Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) implemented in 2000, see Maluccio and Flores 2005 for evaluation. 
  11delivered upon the creation of the business (e.g., business-plan writing, business planning).   
Beneficiaries participated in business-skill training workshops organized locally where other 
family members could attend, but were not conditioned on attendance. 
The conditionality of all three interventions requires that the primary female of the 
household attend group meetings and collect payments while school-age children attend school 
regularly.  The mean household yearly income in 2005 is approximately $1,312 US dollars 
(21,000 Cordobas); program benefits range from US$270 to US$470 for household with one 
eligible child (per household) in cash plus in kind services which signify approximately 25 to 45 
percent of annual household incomes. 
V.  Data and stylized facts 
We use a two-round panel (2005 and 2006) data-set
5 from a detailed household survey designed 
for the program.  The data contain information for 4,200 households in six municipalities located 
in the north-central part of Nicaragua.  The households in this region are mostly subsistence 
farmers who rely on basic grain agriculture and some animal farming activities; agricultural 
participation of children is not uncommon and overall child labor, including domestic activity, is 
commonplace.  Table 1 provides descriptive data on child labor by age and gender and illustrates 
how a large part of working children are employed on family farms and family enterprise while 
the majority engage in domestic chores.  
The second round of data was collected 9 months after the program was implemented, 3 
months before it concluded which may influence why some of the benefits in parts of the program 
(particularly the vocational training course) had not been completely delivered. The panel allows 
us to observe various outcome variables at  1 p  based on the income conditions of the household 
at 0 p .  We can observe the same household over a years’ time which can help us separate changes 
of child labor over time that are attributable to exogenous changes such as the conditional cash 
transfer program under evaluation here and other economic environment or labor market changes.   
We disaggregate work hours from a dichotomous outcome to actual time (hours) use.  
The data has detailed information on activity types worked, to include domestic chores
6.  
Methodologically, the use of hours versus binary outcomes allows for a more robust estimation 
approach and more accurate investigation of the research question.  
 
                                                 
5 The attrition rate is only 2% which is a result of extensive tracking of individuals and households throughout various regions were 
people had moved to. 
6 Kruger and Berthelon (2007) find that excluding domestic work from child labor calculations biases findings in favor of girls and 
against boys.  In other words, it appears as if girls work less because most of their work in their sample in Brazil  is in the house; the 
outcomes are reversed once they account for this labor. 
  12V.1 Descriptive statistics 
The data is structured so that the two work types presented in the model and defined earlier in the 
paper can be differentiated: physical labor work in our definition includes farm work, livestock 
raising for consumption, day laborer as a peon in a farm, water gathering, wood cutting and 
gathering and household chores such as manning the house, cleaning and caring for siblings.  The 
second type is non-physical work which in our definition is a combination of commercial activity, 
retail, service, non-agricultural employment and professional activities.   
Table 1 illustrates some descriptive statistics on child work in 2006 by gender and age 
groups; more than 50% of children between 8 and 15 years old work in non-domestic work, with 
the largest concentration of work hours taking place in agricultural activities, 4 hours for boys and 
2 hours for girls.  Regarding hours worked (not shown in the tables), when we include domestic 
work into the total work hours calculation we get 10 hours on average for both boys and girls.  
Females spend on average 9.7 hours a week in physical labor activities while males spend more 
than 10 hours in this activity.  The difference for control and treatment groups is slightly wider, 1 
hour more for girls and 1.2 hours more for boys in untreated households.  There are no drastic 
differences between the three interventions types in this activity.  Females in treated and 
untreated households work more in non-physical activity than males and kids in households 
receiving the business grant intervention, who work on average .8 hours. 
In Table 2 we present some basic descriptive statistics for all controls and variables of 
interest in the analysis.  The average household income in dollar amount is $1,400 and the 
household average size is 7.  Communities are on average almost more than 1.5 hours away from 
the closest market located in the municipal center which indicates that many of these 
communities are located in remote places throughout the region.  Table 3 illustrates the intensity 
of work for all children (8-15 years of age) by income quintiles; this illustration is broken down 
into young kids (8-12) and older kids (12.1-15) for further evaluation.  We see an increase in 
work hours for all activities in the higher income quintiles; domestic work is the only exception, 
exhibiting the exact opposite relationship.  The data also show that older kids work approximately 
4 hours more per week on average in total work hours, with equally large differences in both non-
physical and physical intensive labor activities.   
VI.  Empirical strategy 
We depart from the basic empirical specifications and present various possibilities that enable us 
to investigate the research question posed in the paper.  We first establish the relationship of 
income and all child labor without the program.  We then allow for children type to vary in order 
to spot potential differences in the effect of income on child labor that may arise in the sub-
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program interventions affects total child labor and child labor by the two types of activities 
presented in the model.  We conclude this part of the analysis by sub-grouping children into types 
(by age and gender). 
In order to ensure that no outliers bias our results we cut 1% in the upper tail of the 
distribution for all (2005 and 2006) continuous variables in the analysis.  Some data is missing or 
made missing in the survey due to sample attrition (2 percent) or digitizing errors, this is a small 
percent of the total sample and does not affect our findings.  All estimations are clustered at the 
community level, following the data collection design.  Lastly we conduct several robustness 
exercises (bootstrapping and widening of the sample to include younger children) and find the 
results are unchanged. 
VI.1      Basic specification 
We begin this section by investigating the relationship between income and child labor.  We then 
proceed to investigate how a program that increases household income as well as contribute to 
human capital opportunities through various investments affects child labor.  In the data section 
we established the success of the randomization which allows us to use the cross section of 
households in the second period to test the hypothesis that the relationship between income and 
child labor is linear up to a point and non-linear thereafter.  We test the relationship using all 
three treatment groups and control group in our sample ( 0123 (,,,) n tt t t t = ).   
We investigate the effect of income on child labor.  The intensity of child labor is 
measured by the total average hours worked   (LH is child labor, L for physical child labor 
and H for non-physical child labor) in all activities, including domestic work, as a dependent 
variable.  Domestic work accounts for a non-trivial number of children who reported zero hours 
worked in other non-domestic activities but had more than zero hours in domestic duties.    
ihc LH
The child labor data has a left hand side censoring problem, particularly for non-physical 
labor, resulting from our inability to observe negative work hours for children who would 
normally have less than zero if it were possible.  We use a special case of censored regressions 
(tobit) to accurately calculate the effect of our variables of interest on child labor.  We use tobit 
for all estimations to keep all results consistent and easily comparable with each other.   We first 
estimate: 
,1 ,0 ,0 i h cp hp hp LH Y S α ηκ =+ + + ε             (16) 
  14where   is the dependent variables related to the intensity of child work estimated for 
child i in household h and community c (cluster) and in the latter period  , 
,1 ihc p LH
1 p ,0 hp Y η  is household 
income lagged,  is a control for household size (later included in the full vector of 
controls), 
,0 hp S κ
α  is a constant and ε  is a normally distributed error term.  In order to test the 
inverted-U relationship of poverty and child labor we included a squared term for   in all 
specifications.   
2
h Y φ
The sample of children included in the study is restricted to kids who are currently 8 
through 15 years of age in 2006 (7-14 in 2005) because a great part of kids do not enter primary 
education until the age of seven and are this is the target group for the program.  We include a 
vector of individual   characteristics and household   attributes in all estimations as 
controls; all right hand side variables for household and community are lagged for 2005. 
Community characteristics that affect the supply and demand of child labor are also included in 
the estimations  .   The revised equation is:   
,( 0) ip X
0) cp
,( 0) hp X
,( X
         
2
,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 i h cp hp hp i ip h hp c cp LH Y Y X X X α ηφ β β β ′ ′′ =+ + + + + + ε                   (17) 
We explore the gender and age dimensions in the study by looking at sub-samples of 
young girls and boys (8-12) and older girls and boys (12.1-15).  Qualitatively we know gender 
differences exist in terms of typical work activities performed by children in this region of 
Nicaragua; boys are typically engaged in agricultural work while girls care for the home and help 
their parents.  Young children are typically assigned domestic work and basic agriculture while 
older children assist adults in more difficult tasks in both non-physical and physical work.  We 
explore this estimation for L and H separately. 
For the individual characteristics included in the  i X  vector, we include: age of child, 
labor is expected to increase with age (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997; Cartwright and 
Patrinos, 1999 etc.) and gender of child when appropriate.   In  h X  we include: household size at 
baseline, number of children in various age cohorts, all affecting the incidence of labor in the 
child labor literature (Kruger and Berthelon, 2003; Edmonds, 2006; Ponczek and Portela Souza, 
2007). For community characteristics  c X we include two variables: total population in the 
community divided by total manzanas of land owned in the community; this variable controls for 
propensity of agricultural work in the community; and, total number of kids in the 7-14 age range 
in 2005 to total population in the community; this indicates availability of child laborers in the 
community. 
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7; 
Emerson and Portela, 2007).  We also include territorial variables that proxy for remoteness by 
measuring the proximity to major services and markets.  Previous work on poverty in Nicaragua 
finds that distance deters children, particularly girls and young children, from attending school 
due to the danger of access particularly during the winter months (Del Carpio 2007).  We add 
distance, measured in terms of time, to the nearest elementary school, health center and the 
nearest large market (municipal headquarters). 
Three-quarters of the sample received the program; it is of interest to apply our empirical 
estimation to investigate the effects of the program, and each of its interventions, on several child 
labor outcomes.  We first include a dummy  hh T δ  (1=treated, 0=control) and then include all three 
intervention dummies where we change  hh T δ  to   in the specification, using the non-
intervention group (control) as a benchmark. The parameter  
0123 (,,,) tttt
h δ  is the coefficient for impact of 
the program and then each intervention by type.   The complete specification with controls is: 
2
,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 i h cp hp hp hp i ip h hp c cp LH T Y Y X X X α δη φ ββ β ′′ ′ =+ + + + + + + ε  (18) 
We repeat the empirical exercises in the program section by separating L and H from 
each other and evaluating the effect of the program on each separately.  We expect that the 
implicit subsidy of the program on children’s alternative activities away from work will reduce 
child labor; by the same token, we expect that as the new productive opportunities in the 
household arise it may be viewed as an opportunity for some children, particularly those unbound 
by the conditionality, to contribute to the households’ production as well as gain some new skills.   
Therefore we expect  hh T δ to decrease L* and increase H* for the older cohort.   
VII.  Results 
We present the results of our empirical work in two main parts: (1) the income-child labor 
relationship, including the analysis for various types of children as presented in the first result in 
the theoretical section, (2) the effect of the CCT program on child labor, including the analysis of 
the effect on two types of work activities and a differentiation by various types of children. 
VII.1 Income and all child labor 





=  in the 
theoretical part. In the model we also find that the utility loss of child labor can be different 
depending on the child’s gender and age; these are represented in the model by the multiplicative 
                                                 
7 In this paper the authors conduct and extensive literature review of the effect of parental schooling on child labor, many of the 
studies included find a negative impact; only one finds no impact. 
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stratifying the sample into gender and age groups to account for various types of children.  
VII.1a Analysis of the effect of income on child labor  
In the model we assume there is a disutility of child labor, modeled as a linear function of each 
type of child labor, both with expected negative coefficients. The quadratic term indicates that the 
relationship between income and child labor has a concave shape (inverted-U) and parents have 
distaste for child labor, conversely since not all child labor is the same we illustrate the 
differences in the model and present them as they relate to each other and with household 
production.   
As the model shows, when the family is on the left hand side of the inverted-U and to the 
left of the maximum turning point (poor family), we see an increase in total child labor.  A basic 
empirical exercise (table 4) tests the U-relationship using total number of work hours (physical 
and non-physical work combined) and shows that indeed income is increasing (positive) up to a 
point and decreasing (negative) thereafter; this relationship is statistically significant when we 
group all kids together, regardless of type.   
These results confirm the first finding of the model, that there is a concave function in the 
relationship between income and child labor that indicates that child labor first increases and then 
decreases as household production passes the maximum point.  This can be interpreted from an 
economic view point and a statistical stand point.  The economic interpretation is that both 
coefficients are going in the direction expected for an inverted-U shape, however given the low 
levels of income of the population sampled in this study, it is only possible to see an inverted-J 
relationship, where the majority of the households fall to the left side of the maximum point 
estimate (MPE example 1) or the point where the curvature takes place.   In other words, the 
sample mean and the majority of the households fall well below the point where an extra dollar of 
income leads to a decrease in child labor.  From a statistical stand point, the inverted-U 
relationship is observed in the appropriate signs for all children.  
In the income figure below, the shape of the curve appears to be more or less uniform, as 
if household incomes for the sample were evenly distributed; however, we note that 95% of the 
households fall to the left of the thick solid line ($3,247) and the peak of the curve is at $3,531, 
beyond the 95 percentile of the distribution.   
Example 1. Maximum point estimate calculations 
All kids Girls Boys
Total household income (in 1000) US$ 1.780 1.970 1.446
Income squared ‐ 0.252 ‐0.322 ‐0.158
Maximum Point Estimate $3,531.7 $3,059.0 $4,575.9  
  17Income (definition 1) and predicted child labor (both genders) 
 
Note: calculations done on all kids 8-15 years of age, Confidence Interval 95% 
VII.1b Income and child labor by types 
We are also interested in the effect of the intensity factors α  and β  which are part of the 
production function, and l and h which represent the cost of labor in the utility function.  This 
multiplicative term in equations (7) and (8), allow us to distinguish between various types of 
children (young and older boys and girls) and evaluate how high families maximize labor given 
their income level.  We stratify the sample first by gender, where we observe that the income-
labor relationship for girls and boys have an inverted-U shape but statistical significance only 
holds for girls; we obtain the same result when we add a full set of control variables.  
When we look at the coefficients for boys and girls we observe striking differences 
between the two genders; table 4a shows (see figures 1a and 1b for a side-by-side graphical 
presentation in the appendix) that boys require substantially more income (approximately $1,500) 
than girls for total labor hours to begin decreasing.  Taking it back to the theory, this can be 
explained through the differences in types of children and the idiosyncratic costs that each type 
has and intensity that each type of kid is assigned.  The utility loss for child labor will vary by 
child type; for example is the context in which the child lives biases favoring one gender over the 
other the utility loss of having one child work versus the other will influence the work allocation 
strategy of the family. 
  We stratify the sample further, to incorporate age into the mix.  In table 4a we observe 
that the relationship for older girls and boys (age 12.1-15) is concave and significant; the 
coefficient for the linear term is substantially larger than the quadratic coefficient.  An increase in 
income for older boys appears to have a stronger increasing effect on total labor than that of older 
girls; however the decreasing effect observed through the negative coefficient on the quadratic 
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young kids (ages 8 through 12) because the statistical significance is lacking in the specifications.  
We can assume that given that most of the households’ income fall well before the maximum 
point, and only less than 10 percent of households pass the maximum point estimate, the 
relationship is more like an inverted-J.  Particularly for girls and older boys, whose sign on the 
income coefficients indicate that they follow the inverted-U pattern.   
VII.2 The program and child labor 
Here we evaluate the effect of the program on all child labor by identifying the relationship 
between the program and each type of intervention on total labor hours.  We present the effect of 
the program on two types of labor activities: physical and non-physical work.  These two types of 
labor activities are derived endogenously as the family decides based on its utility optimization 
strategy how much to allocate children to each one.   In one part of the analysis we hold children 
type constant (all children 8-15) to isolate the effect of the program on each type of labor activity; 
we then introduce types of children to see how the effect of the program varies.  We begin this 
part by comparing the performance of each intervention and the control groups on various types 
of child labor outcome variables. 
VII.2a Analysis of the program-child labor relationship 
We introduce the conditional cash transfer program that benefited three-quarters of our sample.  
The income-child labor relationship was established in the previous section without controlling 
for the program, here we seek to evaluate the performance of the program and see if the inverted-
U shape persists despite the program.  We disaggregate child labor (LH as represented in the 
empirical part) into two types of child labor, L and H.  We know from the model that the impact 
of an increase in the cost of non-physical work is a rise in the ratio L*/H* and the opposite is also 
true, if the cost of physical child labor increases.   
Based on the model presented earlier, we expect the program to reduce child labor 
because it serves as a tax on child labor and reduces the utility cost of the household.  Any 
transfer that subsidizes education for example, makes education cheaper and the extra money 
received by the household for abiding to the conditionality increase the opportunity cost by 
increasing the labor costs, irrespective of labor type (l or h).   From the utility function we know 
that as the cost for l and h rise, all child labor is expected to decrease.  When we evaluate each 
intervention and the corresponding conditionality alone, the amount of child labor by type 
changes depending on the intervention received by the household and the specifics of the 
intervention.  For example, the basic intervention introduces a subsidy to the household making 
  19the cost for labor higher when the child does not attend school; if the household is very poor it 
will increase its production when the opportunity arises by seeking the optimal level of H* and L*  
In the case of the business grant intervention, the effect on child labor is different as the 
intervention introduces a new work opportunity in the household that directly or indirectly 
motivates child labor in one type of activity H, by lowering the cost of h compared to l.  The 
household will seek to have an optimal level of H* and L*.   
In Table 5 we include the program as a dummy variable (1 for program households and 0 
for control households), we control for other determinants and find that the program has a 
decreasing effect on physical labor and total work hours.  The effect is reversed for non-physical 
work with a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that the program promotes non-physical 
labor while decreasing physically demanding work.  The labor-income relationship exhibits the 
expected signs but remains significant for total labor hour only.  In Table 6, we disaggregate the 
program into its three interventions and find that the training intervention is the only one that 
significantly decreases physical labor and total labor hours for all kids.  The basic intervention 
has a negative sign for all types of work but none have statistical significance.  The third 
intervention (productive investment/business grant), has a positive effect on non-physical work 
and no effect on physical labor and total labor hours. 
VII.2b The program and child labor by types of children 
We now allow for type of children to vary by age and gender (bringing in the intensity factor in 
the production function over the cost factor in the utility function) as presented in equations (7) 
and (8).   We expect to see that as the cost of L is lower for one type of child versus another, the 
proportion of that type of child in participating in physical labor will be greater than the other 
type of labor.  Moreover if the opportunity cost of a non-working activity, such as education, is 
lower for older children not targeted by the program and are not subject to the school attendance 
conditionality we expect to see a larger proportion of children in this age cohort participating in 
work activities.   
    We stratify the sample by gender and then by age and gender. Table 7a shows that the 
basic intervention reduces total child labor hours for boys and increases non-physical labor for 
girls; all other relationships are not statistically significant.  The vocational training intervention 
reduces physical labor for boys and total labor hours for boys.  As expected, we find that the 
business intervention positively affects non-physical labor for boys and girls; this intervention has 
no effect on physically demanding labor and total labor hours. 
We look at young and older children by gender and activity type and find that all 
interventions have positive coefficients for non-physical labor and negative coefficients for 
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in non-physical activities and the business intervention has an increasing effect on children of all 
ages and both genders on the same activity.  With respect to physical labor, the vocational 
training intervention has a reducing effect for young children and the business grant intervention 
has a reducing effect for young girls.     
VIII.  Conclusion 
We began this paper by noting that a good theoretical foundation combined with empirical 
applications is not commonplace in the child labor literature due mostly to data restrictions.  In 
this paper we attempt to provide a model that is applied to a rich dataset collected for a 
randomized experiment to answer whether child labor always increases with income; and, how a 
productively focused CCT with three distinct interventions affects child labor. 
When we use total number of work hours the data shows that indeed income is increasing 
up to a point and decreasing thereafter; this relationship is statistically significant when we group 
all kids together, regardless of type.  We conclude that the income and child labor relationship is 
concave but the heterogeneity in income of the sample indicates the actual shape; an inverted-J in 
samples with mostly poor households (left of the turning point) like the one analyzed here instead 
of an inverted-U.   
  We observe that the income effect on labor for girls and boys exhibits an inverted-U 
shape; statistical significance however only holds for girls.  The stratification by gender also 
allows us to observe a large difference in the income level necessary for labor to begin decreasing 
between the genders, girls requiring far less total household income than boys for income-labor 
relationship to be negative.  Once we analyze kids by gender and age group combined we find 
that the concavity observed earlier remains strong for older kids but becomes ambiguous, in terms 
of statistical significance, for younger children.  The model provides a plausible explanation, 
families may look for the child with the highest potential to contribute to the households’ 
production and assign it a high labor intensity factor.  In general, older children are comparatively 
more productive than younger children, thereby making their intensity factor higher and the 
whole labor intensity ratio higher.  
When we include the CCT program in our analysis, we find that it serves as a tax on child 
labor, making it less appealing for parents to send their children to work.  When we disaggregate 
child labor into physical and non-physical work, we find that the program helps decrease physical 
work and increase non-physical labor among all children.  In other words, the program makes the 
cost of physical work higher while unaffecting or decreasing the cost of  non-physical labor.   
Specific components of the program have diverse effects.  Children bound by the conditionality 
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of the program and receiving either the vocational or business grant interventions experience a 
decrease in physical work; while children receiving the basic intervention do not appear to have 
such an effect.  Conversely, the business grant intervention and the basic intervention increase 
non-physical labor for the younger cohort. 
Given the objectives and mechanisms of the program of providing a subsidy for school-
age children’s time away from work while rewarding school attendance and creating 
opportunities for intellectually driven activities in the household (encompassed in non-physical 
work), we find that the intended effect of the program spills over children.  In other words, the 
decline in physical labor and total labor for children and increase in non-physical labor indicates a 
change in the labor composition of the household, even for children. 
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  24Table 1.  Descriptive child labor data by age and gender  
ALL
Obs. All Obs. Control Obs. Treat Obs.  Basic B. Obs. Training B. Obs. Grant B.
Child works in non‐domestic activity 4287 54.4% 1096 55.3% 3191 54.1% 1043 52.7% 1079 53.1% 1069 56.3%
Child works in non‐agro activity 4287 8.7% 1096 4.7% 3191 10.1% 1043 7.0% 1079 6.4% 1069 16.8%
Child works in agro or cattle activity, inc. as a ag‐day labor 4287 44.8% 1096 46.2% 3191 44.3% 1043 42.9% 1079 46.0% 1069 44.0%
Child works in household chores (domestic activity) 4287 91.6% 1096 91.7% 3191 91.6% 1043 90.5% 1079 92.2% 1069 92.0%
Child works in domestic and non‐domestic activities 4287 91.6% 1096 91.7% 3191 91.6% 1043 90.5% 1079 92.2% 1069 92.0%
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 4214 0.399 1078 0.195 3136 0.469 1031 0.34 1067 0.291 1038 0.781
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 4220 2.956 1071 3.218 3149 2.867 1031 2.84 1064 2.850 1054 2.915
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 4235 7.050 1072 7.724 3163 6.821 1034 7.00 1069 6.698 1060 6.767
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 4287 9.870 1096 10.699 3191 9.591 1043 9.75 1079 9.446 1069 9.583
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores and work 4289 10.482 1097 11.201 3192 10.234 1043 10.26 1079 9.881 1070 10.568
FEMALE
Obs. All Obs. Control Obs. Treat Obs.  Basic B. Obs. Training B. Obs. Grant B.
Child works in non‐domestic activity 2102 51.2% 564 53.9% 1538 50.3% 494 49.4% 516 50.0% 528 51.3%
Child works in non‐agro activity 2102 10.1% 564 5.5% 1538 11.8% 494 9.7% 516 7.6% 528 18.0%
Child works in agro or cattle activity, inc. as a ag‐day labor 2102 41.4% 564 45.6% 1538 39.9% 494 38.3% 516 42.6% 528 38.6%
Child works in household chores (domestic activity) 2102 92.1% 564 92.7% 1538 91.8% 494 92.1% 516 92.1% 528 91.3%
Child works in domestic and non‐domestic activities 2102 92.1% 564 92.7% 1538 91.8% 494 92.1% 516 92.1% 528 91.3%
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 2063 0.4556 558 0.222 1505 0.542 485 0.495 510 0.335 510 0.794
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 2097 1.9512 563 2.287 1534 1.828 493 1.706 514 1.839 527 1.932
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 2061 7.9014 544 8.480 1517 7.694 487 7.930 510 7.673 520 7.494
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 2102 9.6938 564 10.462 1538 9.412 494 9.520 516 9.415 528 9.309
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores and work 2104 10.267 565 10.675 1539 10.117 494 10.253 516 9.857 529 10.244
MALE
Obs. All Obs. Control Obs. Treat Obs.  Basic B. Obs. Training B. Obs. Grant B.
Child works in non‐domestic activity 2185 57.4% 532 56.8% 1653 57.6% 549 55.7% 563 56.0% 541 61.2%
Child works in non‐agro activity 2185 7.3% 532 3.8% 1653 8.5% 549 4.6% 563 5.3% 541 15.7%
Child works in agro or cattle activity, inc. as a ag‐day labor 2185 48.0% 532 46.8% 1653 48.4% 549 47.0% 563 49.0% 541 49.2%
Child works in household chores (domestic activity) 2185 91.2% 532 90.6% 1653 91.4% 549 89.1% 563 92.4% 541 92.8%
Child works in domestic and non‐domestic activities 2185 91.2% 532 90.6% 1653 91.4% 549 89.1% 563 92.4% 541 92.8%
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 2151 0.344 520 0.165 1631 0.401 546 0.198 557 0.251 528 0.768
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 2123 3.949 508 4.249 1615 3.855 538 3.875 550 3.795 527 3.898
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 2174 6.242 528 6.946 1646 6.016 547 6.180 559 5.808 540 6.066
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 2185 10.048 532 10.951 1653 9.757 549 9.954 563 9.474 541 9.851
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Table 2. Means for variables in the analysis by gender  
Income for household (in 1000) 2005 4256 1397.86 1389.68 1405.70
basic intervention 4181 24% 23% 25%
training intervention 4181 25% 24% 26%
business grant intervention 4181 25% 25% 25%
age of child in 2006 4289 11.58 11.58 11.58
household size 2005 4289 6.91 6.95 6.87
education level of head 2005 4289 1.32 1.32 1.32
age of head 2005 4289 44.78 44.79 44.76
gender of the household head  4289 0.84 0.83 0.85
(male=1, female=0) in 2005
gender of child (boys=1, girls=0) 2006 4289 51% ‐‐ ‐‐
#of children 5 yr & under 2005 4289 0.72 0.74 0.71
#of children 6‐15 years 2005 4289 2.85 2.87 2.83
#of children 15‐24 years 2005 4289 1.13 1.15 1.10
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 4289 1.59 1.60 1.57
dist. in time to prim. School 2005 4289 0.27 0.27 0.27
dist. in time to health center 2005 4289 1.17 1.18 1.15
tot community owned land/tot population  4235 7.88 8.01 7.75
in community 2005
 tot # of kids in age group in the community /tot comm  4289 0.32 0.32 0.31
population 2005




  26Table 3. Labor participation and hours by Income quintiles  
All 8‐15 both genders
Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 904 0.2782 927 0.4229 928 0.3125 816 0.428 639 0.6213
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 895 2.4688 931 3.0773 924 2.704 815 3.21166 655 3.4886
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 900 7.2928 929 6.9698 928 7.1331 823 6.94848 655 6.8374
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 909 9.6514 942 9.915 939 9.7103 834 9.99532 663 10.201
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores and work 911 10.02 942 10.478 939 10.006 834 10.9558 663 11.198
Age group 8‐12 both genders
Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 514 0.2393 504 0.3433 523 0.2524 447 0.2774 355 0.4873
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 515 1.7462 507 2.1302 526 1.6492 448 2.35156 363 2.6088
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 513 6.5058 505 6.082 523 6.3002 450 5.99444 361 6.0166
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 516 8.2109 509 8.156 529 7.8686 453 8.28035 364 8.5687
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores and work 516 8.393 509 8.5921 529 8.069 453 8.92274 364 9.2912
Age group 12.1‐15 both genders
Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All Obs. All
Total hrs p/wk worked in non‐agro activity 390 0.3295 423 0.5177 405 0.3901 369 0.60976 284 0.7887
Total hrs p/wk worked by child in agro (inc peon) and cattle act. 380 3.4482 424 4.2099 398 4.098 367 4.26158 292 4.5822
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores 387 8.3359 424 8.0271 405 8.2086 373 8.09946 294 7.8452
Total hrs p/wk in non‐skill (physical) work 393 11.543 433 11.983 410 12.087 381 12.0344 299 12.189
Total hrs p/wk worked in chores and work 395 12.145 433 12.694 410 12.506 381 13.373 299 13.52
5th Quintile
5th Quintile
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile
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Table 4.  Analysis of income and total hours of all child labor 
tobit (1) tobit (2) tobit (1) tobit (2) tobit (1) tobit (2)
Income for household (in 1000) 2005 1.258* 1.748** 1.583* 1.947** 0.907 1.446
(1.8) (2.42) (1.88) (2.31) (1.01) (1.58)
Income for household squared ‐ 0.187* ‐0.252* ‐0.270* ‐0.322* ‐0.102 ‐0.158
(‐1.86) (‐1.74) (‐1.66) (‐1.91) (‐0.59) (‐0.9)




household size 2005 ‐0.193*** ‐0.836*** ‐0.120 ‐0.337 ‐0.263*** ‐1.315***
(‐2.69) (‐3.21) (‐1.39) (‐0.97) (‐2.59) (‐4.02)
education level of head 2005 ‐0.350 0.017 ‐0.696**
(‐1.54) (0.07) (‐2.46)
age of head in 2005 0.052** 0.033 0.074**
(2.5) (1.3) (2.54)
gender of household head 2005 ‐0.010 ‐0.801 0.789
(‐0.02) (‐1.41) (0.95)
# of children under 5 years 2005 1.424*** 0.971* 1.819***
(3.5) (1.82) (3.32)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 0.582* 0.076 1.050**
(1.74) (0.17) (2.65)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 0.113 ‐0.202 0.417
(0.39) (‐0.52) (1.05)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 ‐0.052 ‐0.173 0.048
(‐0.24) (‐0.76) (0.15)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 0.724 1.373* 0.112
(1.05) (1.67) (0.12)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.297 0.393 0.235
(0.9) (1.18) (0.53)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.042** ‐0.058*** ‐0.024
in community 2005 (‐2.26) (‐2.65) (‐0.93)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 17.689*** ‐14.30975** ‐20.058**
population 2005 (‐2.75) (‐2.39) (‐2.28)
Observations 4256 4200 2083 2053 2173 2147









  28Table 4a. Analysis of income and total hours of labor by child type (age and gender) 
tobit (1) tobit (2) tobit (1) tobit (2) tobit (1) tobit (2) tobit (1) tobit (2)
Income for household (in 1000) in 2005 1.138 1.598* ‐0.148 0.105 1.7186 2.405* 2.461** 3.012**
(1.2) (1.68) (‐0.13) (0.09) (1.42) (1.9) (2.01) (2.43)
Income for household squared ‐ 0.184 ‐0.238 0.049 0.037 ‐0.324 ‐0.419* ‐0.332 ‐0.383*
(‐0.91) (‐1.14) (0.23) (0.16) (‐1.39) (‐1.63) (‐1.46) (‐1.68)
age of child in 2006 1.737*** 1.931*** 0.788** 0.828*
(9.95) (8.64) (2.05) (1.8)
gender of child (boy=1, girl=0) 2006
household size 2005 ‐0.223** ‐0.646* ‐0.225** ‐0.636 0.028164 0.008 ‐0.392*** ‐2.192***
(‐2.16) (‐1.94) (‐1.7) (‐1.63) (0.19) (0.01) (‐2.8) (‐4.72)
education level of head 2005 0.029 ‐0.642 ‐0.016 ‐0.766*
(0.11) (‐1.65) (‐0.04) (‐1.69)
age of head in 2005 0.051* 0.058 0.026 0.097***
(1.66) (1.56) (0.81) (2.33)
gender of household head 2005 ‐0.686 0.503 ‐0.929 1.188
(‐0.98) (0.52) (‐1.01) (1.07)
# of children under 5 years 2005 1.333** 0.809 0.538 3.029***
(2.52) (1.39) (0.56) (4.03)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 0.077 0.217 0.142 2.109***
(0.2) (0.45) (0.17) (3.4)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 ‐0.055 ‐0.069 ‐0.393 1.113**
(‐0.15) (‐0.15) (‐0.53) (2.03)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 0.088 ‐0.281 ‐0.538 0.431
(0.33) (‐0.78) (‐1.52) (0.98)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 1.546* 0.395 1.136 ‐0.319
(1.91) (0.36) (0.99) (‐0.28)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.175 0.253 0.610 0.257
(0.45) (0.59) (1.38) (0.39)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.057** ‐0.027 ‐0.065** ‐0.015
in community 2005 (‐2.16) (‐1.01) (‐2.24) (‐0.44)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 17.794*** ‐13.764 ‐9.555 ‐28.898***
population 2005 (‐2.63) (‐1.38) (‐1.06) (‐2.59)
Observations 1153 1135 1119 1184 930 918 974 963
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Table 5. Effect of the program on various types of child labor 
physical labor non‐physical labor total labor hours
program household (yes=1, no=0) in 2005 ‐1.178* 3.504*** ‐1.102*
(‐1.93) (4.92) (‐1.64)
income for household (in 1000) in 2005 1.064 1.1719 1.723**
(1.56) (1.18) (2.39)
income for household squared ‐ 0.153 ‐0.0513 ‐0.024*
(‐1.12) (‐0.26) (‐1.66)
age of child in 2006 1.234*** 0.832*** 1.374***
(19.23) (7.64) (18.76)
gender of child (boy=1, girl=0) 2006 0.235 ‐1.603*** 0.356
(0.66) (‐2.98) (0.92)
household size 2005 ‐0.786*** ‐0.350 ‐0.843***
(‐3.2) (‐0.75) (‐3.24)
education level of head 2005 ‐0.296 0.450 ‐0.343
(‐1.46) (1.3) (‐1.52)
age of head in 2005 0.054*** ‐0.004 0.052***
(2.81) (‐0.14) (2.55)
gender of household head 2005 0.044 0.000 0.031
(0.08) (0) (0.06)
# of children under 5 years 2005 1.448*** 0.482 1.426***
(3.81) (0.7) (3.55)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 0.548* ‐0.389 0.601*
(1.76) (‐0.65) (1.79)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 0.234 ‐0.360 0.115
(0.84) (‐0.66) (0.4)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 ‐0.098 0.428 ‐0.084
(‐0.49) (1.18) (‐0.38)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 0.892 0.628 0.612
(1.38) (0.65) (0.89)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.298 ‐0.465 0.322
(1.03) (‐1.11) (0.99)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.039*** ‐0.043 ‐0.048***
in community 2005 (‐2.32) (‐1.2) (‐2.59)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 11.340* ‐8.021 ‐16.189**
population 2005 (‐1.86) (‐1.11) (‐2.44)
Observations 4198 4130 4200






  30Table 6. Effect of each program intervention on various types of child labor  
physical labor non‐physical  total labor hours
basic intervention ‐1.052 1.414 ‐1.143
(‐1.56) (1.47) (‐1.52)
training intervention ‐1.407** 1.155 ‐1.620**
(‐2.09) (1.41) (‐2.25)
business grant intervention ‐1.013 6.288*** ‐0.533
(‐1.58) (7.77) (‐0.75)
income for household (in 1000) in 2005 1.150* 1.440 1.7902***
(1.75) (1.49) (2.61)
income for household squared  ‐0.180 ‐0.087 ‐0.261**
(‐1.41) (‐0.47) (‐1.92)
age of child in 2006 1.241*** 0.834*** 1.381***
(19.25) (7.38) (18.98)
gender of child (boy=1, girl=0) 2006 0.268 ‐1.736*** 0.422
(0.73) (‐3.33) (1.08)
household size 2005 ‐0.739*** ‐0.280 ‐0.793***
(‐2.98) (‐0.64) (‐3.06)
education level of head 2005 ‐0.255 0.411 ‐0.311
(‐1.31) (1.19) (‐1.45)
age of head in 2005 0.053*** ‐0.012 0.051**
(2.75) (‐0.42) (2.48)
gender of household head 2005 ‐0.149 ‐0.190 ‐0.200
(‐0.28) (‐0.21) (‐0.37)
# of children under 5 years 2005 1.366*** 0.283 1.311***
(3.58) (0.44) (3.31)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 0.511 ‐0.456 0.558*
(1.62) (‐0.78) (1.66)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 0.194 ‐0.549 0.057
(0.7) (‐1.05) (0.2)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 ‐0.103 0.248 ‐0.095
(‐0.51) (0.67) (‐0.43)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 0.865 0.571 0.626
(1.34) (0.65) (0.92)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.317 ‐0.227 0.359
(1.08) (‐0.54) (1.1)
tot community owned land/tot population  ‐0.037** ‐0.029 ‐0.046**
in community 2005 (‐2.13) (‐0.85) (‐2.34)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm  ‐10.905* ‐6.805 ‐15.456**
population 2005 (‐1.78) (‐1) (‐2.35)
Observations 4101 4040 4103





  31Table 7a.  Analysis of the program on various labor activities by gender  
basic intervention 2.462** ‐0.147 ‐0.992 ‐1.056 ‐0.551 ‐1.675*
(2.17) (0.11) (1.27) (1.26) (‐0.66) (‐1.78)
training intervention 1.240 0.974 ‐1.127 ‐1.598* ‐1.126 ‐2.073**
(1.31) (0.75) (1.54) (1.76) (‐1.48) (‐2.06)
business grant intervention 5.766*** 6.852*** ‐0.812 ‐1.185 ‐0.076 ‐0.989
(6.74) (5.76) (1.17) (1.36) (‐0.1) (‐1.01)
income for household (in 1000) 2005 1.394 1.491 1.438* 0.789 1.899** 1.6252*
(1.22) (1.03) (1.81) (0.91) (2.28) (1.81)
income for household squared ‐ 0.127 ‐0.004 ‐0.251 ‐0.089 ‐0.311* ‐0.196
(0.60) (0.01) (1.54) (0.54) (‐1.82) (‐1.16)
age of child in 2006 0.782*** 0.905*** 1.160*** 1.311*** 1.247*** 1.504***
(5.14) (4.88) (11.69) (11.66) (12.28) (11.77)
household size 2005 0.133 ‐1.038 ‐0.298 ‐1.155*** ‐0.335 ‐1.222***
(0.28) (1.62) (0.90) (3.52) (‐0.96) (‐3.77)
education level of head 2005 0.830** ‐0.084 ‐0.002 ‐0.496** 0.027 ‐0.622**
(2.47) (0.15) (0.01) (2.07) (0.11) (‐2.32)
age of head in 2005 0.023 ‐0.062 0.031 0.078*** 0.031 0.073**
(0.74) (1.20) (1.37) (2.85) (1.24) (2.5)
gender of household head 2005 ‐0.331 ‐0.046 ‐0.960 0.686 ‐0.984 0.561
(0.29) (0.04) (1.62) (0.83) (‐1.63) (0.66)
# of children under 5 years 2005 ‐0.161 1.114 0.910* 1.767*** 0.886* 1.668***
(0.26) (1.19) (1.80) (3.26) (1.66) (3.08)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 ‐0.720 0.139 0.067 0.904** 0.045 1.014***
(1.13) (0.17) (0.15) (2.43) ‐(0.1) (2.63)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 ‐0.721 ‐0.160 ‐0.099 0.467 ‐0.206 0.300
(1.28) (0.23) (0.26) (1.19) (‐0.52) (0.75)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 0.274 0.234 ‐0.196 ‐0.023 ‐0.178 ‐0.026
(0.74) (0.44) (0.98) (0.07) (‐0.76) (‐0.08)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 0.942 ‐0.061 1.472* 0.282 1.342* ‐0.038
(0.82) (0.04) (1.91) (0.35) (1.66) (‐0.04)
dist. in time to health center 2005 ‐0.431 0.037 0.383 0.277 0.452 0.307
(0.87) (0.07) (1.22) (0.68) (1.36) (0.69)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.042 ‐0.016 ‐0.054** ‐0.021 ‐0.059*** ‐0.030
in community 2005 (1.23) (0.32) (2.44) (0.85) (‐2.57) (‐1.12)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 8.402 ‐5.017 ‐7.596 ‐13.274 ‐12.288** ‐17.518*
population 2005 (0.94) (0.45) (1.40) (1.57) (‐2.1) (‐1.88)
Observations 1972 2068 2002 2099 2004 2099












  32Table 7b.  Analysis of the program on non-physical labor by child type 
basic intervention 3.526** ‐3.615* 1.858 2.651
(2.15) (1.77) (1.43) (1.55)
training intervention 1.737 0.486 0.948 1.830
(1.17) (0.30) (0.79) (1.02)
business grant intervention 6.311*** 5.776*** 5.393*** 8.484***
(5.17) (4.27) (4.31) (5.39)
income for household (in 1000) 2005 ‐0.058 1.976 2.337 1.456
(0.04) (1.00) (1.58) (0.84)
income for household squared  0.072 ‐0.054 ‐0.263 ‐0.031
(0.26) (0.16) (0.91) (0.09)
age of child in 2006 1.056*** 2.286*** 0.276 1.204**
(3.05) (4.17) (0.60) (2.58)
household size 2005 0.622 ‐0.349 ‐0.276 ‐1.726*
(1.07) (0.51) (0.42) (1.87)
education level of head 2005 0.738 ‐0.495 1.003** 0.380
(1.59) (0.69) (2.17) (0.60)
age of head in 2005 ‐0.027 ‐0.061 0.071 ‐0.052
(0.67) (1.13) (1.59) (0.77)
gender of household head 2005 ‐1.071 1.091 0.049 ‐0.886
(0.73) (0.62) (0.04) (0.58)
# of children under 5 years 2005 ‐0.521 0.409 0.116 1.632
(0.60) (0.37) (0.14) (1.52)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 ‐1.250* ‐0.544 ‐0.142 0.724
(1.76) (0.58) (0.16) (0.65)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 ‐1.292* ‐0.896 ‐0.228 0.496
(1.66) (1.03) (0.32) (0.51)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 0.078 ‐0.045 0.409 0.494
(0.17) (0.08) (0.78) (0.70)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 ‐0.828 0.864 1.897 ‐1.388
(0.53) (0.74) (1.37) (0.72)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.026 0.477 ‐0.756 ‐0.420
(0.04) (0.74) (1.16) (0.49)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.013 ‐0.043 ‐0.074* 0.007
in community 2005 (0.33) (0.76) (1.71) (0.10)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 17.387 ‐18.041 ‐0.635 7.366
population 2005 (1.51) (1.36) (0.05) (0.56)
Observations 1101 1144 871 924














  33Table 7c.  Analysis of the program on physical labor by child type 
basic intervention ‐1.123 ‐1.160 ‐0.879 ‐0.691
(1.31) (1.30) (0.82) (0.55)
training intervention ‐1.818** ‐1.682* ‐0.346 ‐1.360
(2.27) (1.80) (0.34) (1.04)
business grant intervention ‐1.325* ‐0.298 ‐0.196 ‐1.964
(1.70) (0.32) (0.19) (1.52)
income for household (in 1000) in 2005 1.372 ‐0.395 1.540 2.197*
(1.46) (0.36) (1.40) (1.95)
income for household squared ‐ 0.203 0.107 ‐0.302 ‐0.323
(0.94) (0.47) (1.36) (1.59)
age of child in 2006 1.594*** 1.682*** 1.002*** 0.615
(9.92) (8.62) (2.63) (1.48)
household size 2005 ‐0.586* ‐0.652* 0.050 ‐1.770***
(1.85) (1.78) (0.08) (3.83)
education level of head 2005 ‐0.047 ‐0.454 0.040 ‐0.571
(0.20) (1.38) (0.11) (1.56)
age of head in 2005 0.046 0.067* 0.029 0.089**
(1.63) (1.95) (0.99) (2.21)
gender of household head 2005 ‐0.514 0.680 ‐1.478 0.784
(0.79) (0.70) (1.57) (0.77)
# of children under 5 years 2005 1.341*** 0.904 0.325 2.769***
(2.60) (1.64) (0.35) (3.55)
# of children 5‐14 years 2005 0.030 0.381 0.172 1.557***
(0.08) (0.87) (0.21) (2.65)
# of children 15‐24 years 2005 ‐0.006 0.028 ‐0.247 1.051*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.34) (1.95)
dist. in time to municipal hq 2005 0.053 ‐0.319 ‐0.545* 0.259
(0.22) (0.93) (1.71) (0.56)
dist. in time to primary school 2005 1.783** 0.481 1.134 0.097
(2.11) (0.47) (1.13) (0.10)
dist. in time to health center 2005 0.168 0.260 0.565 0.414
(0.44) (0.65) (1.34) (0.66)
tot community owned land/tot population ‐ 0.058** ‐0.028 ‐0.052* ‐0.005
in community 2005 (2.28) (1.03) (1.80) (0.17)
 tot # of kids age group in comm /tot comm ‐ 10.173* ‐6.568 ‐4.321 ‐22.459**
population 2005 (1.69) (0.70) (0.50) (2.14)
Observations 1108 1158 894 941













  34Figure 1a and 1b. Income (definition 1) and predicted child labor (gender) 
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